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I. INTRODUCTION
On July 6, 1998, the Council of Ministers of the European Union
adopted a proposal calling for a ban on all tobacco advertising in the Euro-
pean Union.' The far-reaching measure will phase out not only press and
billboard advertisements, but will also prohibit tobacco company sponsor-
ship of sporting events.2 The likelihood of challenges to this measure by
European advertising interests3 raises the question of whether the measure
is consistent with EU law governing freedom of expression. This raises the
further issue of whether the EU's existing ban on broadcast tobacco adver-
tising 4 could survive a legal challenge. Finally, the analysis of cigarette ad-
vertising in the European Union provides an opportunity to reconsider the
validity of the current ban on broadcast tobacco advertising in the United
States.
In order to assess the validity of restrictions on tobacco advertising in
the European Union and the United States, this Note first provides a gen-
eral framework of EU law. It next examines the extent to which European
and American courts have protected the freedom of expression in two
other areas-professional publicity and advertisement of abortion services.
These are both areas that have traditionally been considered commercial
speech, and on which the courts of the European Union and the United
States have reached somewhat similar conclusions. This Note next ana-
lyzes new and existing restrictions on cigarette advertising in the European
Union, together with their American counterparts. This Note then argues
that the existing EU ban on broadcast tobacco advertising may violate the
European Convention on Human Rights and that the new total ban will
clearly do so. Finally, this Note concludes that while the current U.S. ban
on broadcast tobacco advertising would likely be upheld under the Su-
preme Court's treatment of commercial speech, both the U.S. and EU
broadcast bans are more restrictive than necessary and should be narrowed
to allow truthful cigarette advertising targeted at adults.
1. Directive 98/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998
on the Advertising and Sponsorship of Tobacco Products, 1998 O.J. (L 213) 9.
2. Id.
3. Patrick Smyth, Newspapers Fight EU Tobacco Ad Ban, IRISH TIMEs, Dec. 3, 1997,
at 10.
4. See Council Directive of 3 October 1989 on Television Broadcasting Activities,
1989 O.J. (L 298) 23. For an extended analysis of the European Convention Council Direc-
tive containing the ban on broadcast cigarette advertising, see Fred H. Cate, The First




II. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
The European Union today, consisting of fifteen nations,5 traces its
roots to the European Communities created by the Treaty of Rome. This
treaty, signed in 1957, was later modified by the Treaties of Luxembourg
(1970), Maastricht (1992), Amsterdam (1997), and the Single European
Act (1986).6 While the treaties, as agreements between sovereign States,
may be thought of as containing an implied right of repudiation, the trea-
ties contain no provisions for withdrawal and are therefore considered by
some to be quasi-constitutional in nature. Furthermore, the Member States
are not free to interpret EU law in any way they see fit. Rather, they are
bound by the interpretations of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), and
where applicable, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR).
A. The Treaties
Since the European Union is a supranational organization, treaties are
the primary source of its law. The Treaty on European Union (Maastricht
Treaty), signed in 1992, created the European Union on the foundation of
the European Communities.7 The Maastricht Treaty incorporates by refer-
ence the European Convention on Human Rights (Convention).' Article 10
of the Convention provides that:
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall
include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart infor-
mation and ideas without interference by public authority and re-
gardless of frontiers.
2. The exercise of these freedoms ... may be subject to such formal-
ities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law
and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of
national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of the reputation
or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information
received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and
impartiality of the judiciary.9
5. When referring to the nations of the European Union, this Note follows standard
international terminology and uses the term "State' interchangeably.
6. In fact, the Treaty of Rome (or EEC Treaty) built its institutions on those of the
European Coal and Steel Community, created in 1951. For an excellent general history of
European integration, unfortunately completed before the signing of the Maastricht Treaty,
see DEREK W. URWIN, THE COMMUNITY OF EUROPE: A HISTORY OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
SINcE 1945 (1991).
7. P.S.R.F. MATHIJSEN, A GuIDE TO EUROPEAN UNION LAW 3-4 (6th ed. 1995).
8. Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 224) 1, art. F [Treaty of
Maastricht].
9. COUNCIL OF EUROPE, EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTs: COLLECrED
TEXTs art. 10 (1987).
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The Convention, as incorporated by the Maastricht Treaty, provides
the substantive source for the freedom of expression analyzed here. If the
freedom were based on Article 10(1) alone, it would appear to be absolute.
However, this right may lawfully be subjected to the limitations allowed in
Article 10(2). The extent to which the Member States may limit freedom
of expression under Article 10(2) has provided material for much litiga-
tion. The validity of such restrictions on commercial speech is the key is-
sue addressed by this Note. 0
B. The Courts
The court that enjoys the greatest stature in the framework of the
European Union is the European Court of Justice. The ECJ, which has
been called "one of the strongest of the EU's political institutions,"" has
broad powers of judicial review of acts by EU institutions and Member
States.12 Two important doctrines help explain the importance of ECJ deci-
sions to Member States--direct effect and supremacy. Under the doctrine
of direct effect, the treaties of the European Union are read to create rights
10. Where commercial speech is concerned, the freedom often relates to another basic
freedom of the Maastricht Treaty, the freedom to provide services. See, e.g., Case C-159/90,
Society for the Protection of Unborn Children Ir. Ltd. v. Grogan, 1991 E.C.R. 1-4685,
[1991] 2 C.M.L.R. 849 (1991). The freedom to provide services is based on Articles 59 to
66 of the Treaty of Rome. See generally MATHUSEN, supra note 7, at ch. 4. While practical
difficulties remain concerning the application of this freedom to lawyers and certain others,
the Treaty theoretically allows professionals to offer their services in either their home
states or in another EU Member State. The freedom to provide services is beyond the scope
of this Note, however, so the discussion of Society for the Protection of Unborn Children v.
Grogan and other cases will be limited to the applicability of Article 10 of the Convention.
11. Karen J. Alter, The European Court's Political Power, 19 W. EuR. POL. 458, 459
(1996).
12. See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. (C
224) 1, arts. 173-77, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573 (1992) [hereinafter EEC Treaty]. See generally
GEORGE A. BERMANN Er AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN CoMUIrrY LAW chs. 4,
7 (1993). Concerning acts of EU institutions, it bears mentioning here that the European
Union is not a party to the Convention, and the Convention therefore does not directly gov-
ern actions by EU institutions. Id. at 146. However, the Parliament, Council, and Commis-
sion of the European Union have issued a non-binding declaration in support of the Con-
vention. Joint Declaration by the European Parliament and the Commission Concerning the
Protection of Fundamental Rights and the European Convention for the Protection of Hu-
man Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 1977 O.J. (C 103) 1; see also BERMANN ET AL.,
supra, at 146. Furthermore, one expert has argued that the European Union is in fact bound
by the Convention. See Henry G. Schermers, The European Communities Bound by Fun-
damental Human Rights, 27 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 249, 251-52 (1990). Moreover, the
ECJ has recognized the existence of certain "fundamental" rights that may or may not be
explicitly granted by the relevant treaties. BERMANN Er AL., supra, at 142. This Note as-
sumes that the ECJ would entertain a claimed violation of the Convention by EU institu-
tions, whether the claim was couched in terms of the Convention itself or of unwritten,
"fundamental" rights.
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that individuals may claim in national courts without any further icorpo-
ration of the treaty into national law. 3 The doctrine of supremacy posits
that Member States are prohibited from enforcing any law that conflicts
with an EU law, whether the national law was enacted before or after the
EU law in question. 14 Therefore, individuals have the right to use EU law
to challenge national laws in the Member States' own courts, and national
courts may, depending on their internal laws governing the reception of
EU law, refuse to enforce the national laws if a conflict is found with an
EU law. 5 Furthermore, even if the national court does not find a violation,
the courts of the Member State may no longer apply the offending law if
the ECJ declares that the law of a Member State is in conflict with EU
law.
6
The other court that is relevant for the purposes of this analysis is the
European Court of Human Rights. While the ECHR is not part of the
structure of the European Union and therefore may not review acts by EU
institutions, it has jurisdiction over "all cases concerning the interpretation
and application" of the Convention so that its interpretation of the Con-
vention may be regarded as persuasive authority. 7 Since all Member States
have bound themselves to the Convention 8 and submitted to the Conven-
tion's separate legal order, they are bound by decisions of the ECHR.
While it is conceivable that the ECJ could refuse to apply the terms of the
Convention to EU institutions even if the ECHR found a violation of the
Convention by an EU Member State in its implementation of an offending
EU directive, this possibility seems remote.' 9 It should be pointed out that
the European courts, which in principle follow the continental practice of
only deciding the case presented, attach a great deal of weight to prece-
dent.2 Strictly speaking, there is no rule of stare decisis-the courts are
free to disregard prior decisions.2' However, in practice the courts do fol-
13. See Case 26/62, van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Tariefcomnissie, 1963 E.C.R. 1,
[1963] C.M.L.R. 105 (1963). See generally BERMANN ETAL., supra note 12, at 180-82.
14. See Case 6/64, Costa v. Ente Nazionale per 'Energia Elettrica, 1964 E.C.R. 585,
[1964] C.M.L.R. 425 (1964). See generally BERMANNETAL., supra note 12, at 192-93.
15. See generally BERMANN ET AL., supra note 12, at 204-06.
16. See EEC TREATY, supra note 12, art. 177.
17. EUROPEAN CONVENTION ONHUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 9, art. 45.
18. In addition to ratifying the Convention in their capacities as sovereign nations, the
EU Member States have reiterated their commitment to the Convention in the Maastricht
Treaty. See supra text accompanying note 7.
19. See supra note 12.
20. HENRY G. SCHERMERS & DENIS F. WAELBROECK, JUDICIAL PROTECTION IN THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNrTsS §§ 166-72 (5th ed. 1992).
21. Id. § 166, at 95.
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low their prior decisions, so studying European case law can provide in-
22
sight into the law as it stands today.
mH. CASE LAW ON COMMERCIAL SPEECH IN THE EUROPEAN
UNION AND THE UNITED STATES
The ECJ and the U.S. Supreme Court have faced many similar issues
concerning restrictions on commercial speech and have ultimately devel-
oped rules for such restrictions that are somewhat similar. First, both
Courts have considered restrictions on publicity by lawyers and other pro-
fessionals. Second, they have analyzed restraints on advertisement for
abortion services. In both areas, the Courts have applied balancing tests
that generally recognize a right to free expression, with some limitations in
the commercial context.
A. Professional Advertising
As in the United States, professionals in the European Union face a
conflict between traditional standards of professionalism, abhorring adver-
tisement in any form, and modem economic realities, sometimes making
advertisement a question of professional survival.2 Even though most of
the EU Member States allow lawyers to advertise in some form, the re-
strictions vary considerably from one state to another. 2 These restrictions
raise two questions concerning the scope of Article 10 of the Convention.
First, does the freedom of expression granted in Article 10(1) include
commercial speech? Second, to what extent may a state abridge this free-
dom without exceeding the limitations allowed by Article 10(2)?
Unlike the U.S. Supreme Court, which was at one time reluctant to
apply First Amendment protection to commercial speech, the European
courts have held without qualification that Article 10 of the Convention
applies to commercial speech.5 This makes sense for two reasons. First,
the language of Article 10(1) in no way excludes commercial speech,
while at the same time Article 10(2) provides states with the authority to
regulate advertising when necessary. Second, European integration was,
from the beginning, predominantly an effort to integrate economic sec-
26tors, so protection of commercial speech fits the purposes of the treaties.
22. Id. §§ 166-67.
23. See Louise L. Hill, Lawyer Publicity in the European Union: Bans Are Removed
but Barriers Remain, 29 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 381, 383 (1995).
24. Id.
25. See Coca v. Spain, 18 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1994).
26. See URWIN, supra note 6, at 58.
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Much more complicated than the applicability of Article 10(1) to
commercial speech is the issue of a State's authority to restrict commercial
speech under Article 10(2). This entails a four-part analysis. First, is the
action carried out by a public authority? 7 Second, is the restriction
"prescribed by law"? Third, is the aim of the measure legitimate under
Article 10(2)?29 Finally, is the law "necessary in a democratic society"?30
In the leading case of Coca v. Spain, the European Court of Human
Rights found that a Spanish Royal Decree prohibiting nearly all lawyer ad-
vertising did not violate Article 10 of the Convention.3 The lawyer in-
volved had been sanctioned by the Barcelona Bar Council after placing an
advertisement containing his name, the title "letrado" (lawyer), and his of-
fice address and telephone number in a local homeowners' newsletter.32
The Court found that the Bar Council had the character of a public author-
ity,33 the royal decree in question constituted a legal basis for the prohibi-
tionm and protecting the public and other members of the profession was a
legitimate goal.35
After finding the first three parts of the test satisfied, the Court then
considered whether such a prohibition was necessary in a democratic soci-
ety. For a restriction on speech to be compatible with Article 10 of the
Convention, it must be "justifiable in principle and proportionate." 6 Con-
cerning the justifiability of the measure, the Court reasoned that even
"objective, truthful advertisements might be restricted in order to ensure
respect for the rights of others or owing to the special circumstances of
particular business activities and professions."'37 In this case, the punish-
ment had been limited to a written warning; the rule allowed advertising in
certain limited circumstances; and finally, the Council of the Catalonia
Bars had relaxed its advertising rules after the events in question.3 ' Based
on these facts, the Court held that the authorities' action was not
"unreasonable and disproportionate to the aim pursued. 39
27. See Coca, 18 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 11.
28. See Barthold v. F.R.G., 7 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 398-400 (1985).
29. See id. at 400.
30. See id. at 401-04.
31. Coca, 18 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A).
32. Id. at 3.
33. Id. at 11-12.
34. Id. at 12.
35. Id. at 12-13.
36. Id. at 24.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 24-25.
39. Id. at 25.
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The European Court of Human Rights, however, had found a viola-
tion in the earlier case of Barthold v. Gernany.40 This case involved a vet-
erinary surgeon who had criticized the lack of emergency veterinary serv-
ices available at night in Hamburg in a newspaper interview, incidentally
mentioning his own name and profession .4 After referral of the matter by
fellow veterinary surgeons, the local businessmen's association obtained
an injunction against Dr. Barthold that prohibited his repeating to a jour-
nalist any of the items he had discussed in his prior interview. 2 Any viola-
tion of the injunction could result in fines of up to 500,000 DM
(approximately U.S. $280,000) or imprisonment of up to six months per
43
occurrence.
Applying the same test used in Coca, the Court first held that the in-
volvement of the court of appeals clearly constituted an "interference by
public authority." Second, the Court determined that the veterinary pro-
fession possessed rulemaking authority by virtue of a delegation by Par-
liament, so the interference was prescribed by law.45 Third, the Court con-
ceded that the stated goal of the measures in question, preventing unfair
competition, was legitimate.46 However, concerning the necessity of the
law, the Court found the measure disproportionate to the alleged harm af-
ter taking into account the nature of Dr. Barthold's statements, which were
not primarily advertising by nature but informational, and the truth of the
problem of which Dr. Barthold had complained.47
While these two cases differ in their facts and outcomes, several
broad rules appear to govern the rights of professional publicity in the
European Union. First, any action by a purely private body would not fall
within the scope of Article 10 of the Convention. Second, no restriction on
speech is subject to review unless it has a "basis in law," although this re-
quirement is read quite broadly. Third, a restriction that completely takes
away the rights of professionals to seek publicity will likely be found in
violation of Article 10. Finally, the Court will consider the nature of the
punishment involved.
Like the ECJ, the U.S. Supreme Court has also found itself con-
fronted with the issue of whether professional publicity is protected
40. Barthold, 7 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1985).
41. Id. at 386.
42. Id. at 387-89.
43. Id. at 389.
44. Id. at 398.
45. Id. at 398-400.
46. Id. at 400.
47. Id. at 403-04.
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speech. The contemporary doctrine of the Court on the question of profes-
sional publicity traces its origin to the decision in Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc4' There, the Su-
preme Court held unconstitutional a Virginia statute that declared the ad-
vertisement of prescription drugs by a licensed pharmacist to be unprofes-
sional conduct.4 ' Following its earlier decision in Bigelow v. Virginia,0
discussed infra Part Ill.B, the Court rejected the idea that purely commer-
cial speech, which "does 'no more than propose a commercial transac-
tion,'' is "wholly outside the protection of the First Amendment.52
Less than a year after its decision in Virginia State Board of Phar-
macy, the Court turned to the question of whether lawyer advertising was
also subject to First Amendment protection.53 In Bates v. State Bar of Ari-
zona, the petitioners had been sanctioned for placing a truthful advertise-
ment in a daily newspaper in violation of a rule of the Arizona Supreme
Court.5 The Court considered the various justifications offered by the State
Bar in support of the rule and concluded that none of them provided a suf-
ficient reason to justify a ban on all lawyer advertising.5 However, the
Court did not end its analysis there. Refusing to apply standard First
Amendment overbreadth analysis in the commercial speech context, the
Court considered whether the petitioners' speech was in fact outside the
scope of First Amendment protection. Finding that the speech had not
been misleading, the Court concluded that the speech was protected and
struck down the rule.57
Several years after its decision in Bates, the Court in In re R.M.
5 1
again upheld the freedom of lawyers to advertise. This case involved a rule
of the Supreme Court of Missouri, revised after Bates, that severely lim-
ited advertising by lawyers.59 The advertisements in question included
certain information that was not expressly permitted by the Missouri rule,
as well as a listing of practice areas that did not conform to the categories
48. Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
49. Id. at 770.
50. Bigelow, 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
51. Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 762 (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v.
Human Rel. Coumn'n, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973)).
52. Id. at 761.
53. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
54. Id. at 354, 356.
55. Id. at 368-79.
56. Id. at380-81.
57. Id. at 381-83.
58. R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982).
59. Id. at 193-94.
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specified by the rule." The Court applied the test of Central Hudson Gas &
Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission:
6
'
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected
by the First Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that
provision, it at least must concern lawful activity and not be mislead-
ing. Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental interest is sub-
stantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine
whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest as-
serted, and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve
that interest.62
First, the Court in R.M.J. found that the lawyer's expression was
protected by the First Amendment because it concerned lawful activity and
was not misleading. 63 Then the Court determined that there was no sub-
stantial state interest in prohibiting truthful advertising.6' Since the Court
found the advertising not to be misleading based on the record before it
and ascertained no substantial state interest, the Court did not need to
reach the third and fourth prongs of the Central Hudson test.'
B. Abortion Services
Advertising for abortion services is another area where the European
Union has faced the dilemma of whether to give more weight to the free-
doms granted by its treaties or to the national policies of EU Member
States. The problem stems from the fact that Ireland, a Member of the
European Union since 1972, 6 has the "most restrictive abortion laws in the
West." 67 Such laws have existed since 1861 and were made part of Ire-
land's constitution by a 1983 referendum. 68 Not only do these laws prohibit
abortion in nearly all situations, but they have also historically prohibited
the giving of information related to abortion services in other States.
In 1989, the Society for the Protection of Unborn Children (SPUC)
moved for an injunction against a group of Dublin college students to pre-
vent the group from publishing abortion information in its annual student
guide. 69 The lower court declined to rule on questions relating to the treaty
60. Id. at 196-97.
61. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
62. Id. at 566.
63. R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 205.
64. Id.
65. See id. at 205-06.
66. URWIN, supra note 6, at 253.
67. Elisabeth Porter, Culture, Community and Responsibilities: Abortion in Ireland, 30
Soc. 279, 279 (1996).
68. Id. at 283.
69. Case C-159/90, Society for the Protection of Unborn Children It. Ltd. v. Grogan,
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and referred the case to the ECJ.70 Before the ECJ heard the appeal, the
Irish Supreme Court granted SPUC a permanent injunction.
After holding fhat Ireland had not interfered with the provision of a
service, the Court turned to the question of whether the law violated the
freedom of speech granted in Article 10(1) of the Convention. Without
analyzing this question, the Court simply held that:
[It is not contrary to Community law for a Member State in which
medical termination of pregnancy is forbidden to prohibit students as-
sociations from distributing information about the identity and location
of clinics in another Member State where voluntary termination of
pregnancy is lawfully carried out and the means of communicating
with those clinics, where the clinics in question have no involvement". - • • 72
in the distribution of the said information.
This decision contained two distinct ideas, one obvious and the other
less so. First, the ECJ found no foundation in the Treaty for an individual
right to disseminate information of this nature. Second, the narrowness of
the holding, only applying to student groups and explicitly excluding clin-
ics that are involved in the distribution of the prohibited information, also
suggests that the outcome might have been different had the Irish law in-
terfered with the operations of a service provider.
While the ECJ left some doubt whether the ban on abortion informa-
tion constituted a violation of human rights when applied to service pro-
viders, the European Court of Human Rights removed any doubt when it
held in 1992 that the ban violated Article 10 of the Convention.73 In this
case, the ECHR directly faced the question of whether organizations in the
business of counseling pregnant women could lawfully be prohibited from
providing their clients with information on obtaining abortions in another
EU Member State.74 Proceeding through the same steps that the ECJ had
followed in Barthold, the ECHR found that there was an interference with
the applicants' rights, that the restriction was "prescribed by law," and that
the aims of the restriction were legitimate under Article 10(2). 7*
When the Court reached the question of whether the restriction was
"necessary in a democratic society," it considered the necessity and pro-
portionality of the measures.76 First, concerning the necessity of the re-
1991 E.C.R. 1-4685, para. 2, [1991] 3 C.M.L.R. 849 (1991).
70. Id.
71. Id.; see also Porter, supra note 67, at 283.
72. Society for the Protection of Unborn Children, 1991 E.C.R. at para. 33.
73. Open Door Counselling & Dublin Well Woman v. Ireland, 15 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser.
A) at 268 (1992).
74. Id. at 247.
75. Id. at 261-63.
76. Id. at 264-68.
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straint, the Court observed that it was not a criminal offense for a pregnant
Irish woman to travel abroad for an abortion.77 Turning to the question of
proportionality, the Court first noted the "perpetual" nature of the restraint
and stated that "[o]n that ground alone the restriction appears over-broad
and disproportionate., 78 The Court then considered the fact that the appli-
cants' counselors only provided objective information and did not recom-
mend particular courses of action.79 It also mentioned the availability of
abortion information in other sources, such as magazines and telephone di-
rectories. 0 Finally, the Court referred to undisputed evidence that sug-
gested that the ban on information harmed women's health by rendering
inadequate the available pregnancy counseling services.8'
In response to the decision in Open Door Counselling and Dublin
Well Woman, Ireland passed a referendum the same year allowing access
to abortion information available in another state.2 Consequently, the
Convention's protections of commercial speech have greatly expanded the
rights granted by Ireland's constitution, which still enshrines the right of
the unborn to life but now recognizes freedom of expression in the context
of advertising for abortion services. At the same time, the decision raises
serious policy questions concerning the future of national sovereignty
within the European Union.
The U.S. Supreme Court addressed the issue of advertising for abor-
tion services in Bigelow v. Virginia.83 In Bigelow, a newspaper editor had
been convicted of a misdemeanor for carrying an advertisement in his
newspaper for an abortion referral service in New York. 4 The Court noted
its decision in Roe v. Wade,85 which had followed the appellant's convic-
tion and constitutionalized the right to an abortion during the first trimes-
ter.86 Emphasizing both the legality of the services advertised and the
"public interest" nature of the message,' the Court distinguished its previ-
ous decisions in Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human
Relations" and Valentine v. Chrestensen.89 The Court then balanced Vir-
77. Id. at 266.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 267.
81. Id.
82. See Porter, supra note 67, at 285-86.
83. Bigelow, 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
84. Id. at 811-12.
85. Roe, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
86. Id.
87. Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 821-22.
88. Pittsburgh Press Co., 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
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ginia's interest in "regulating what Virginians may hear or read about the
New York services" against the appellant's interest in free expression, and
concluded that the latter clearly prevailed.9°
IV. ANALYSIS: THE STATUS OF BANS ON TOBACCO
ADVERTISING
The EU Council of Ministers and Parliament have adopted a directive
calling for a complete ban on tobacco advertising in the European Union."
In view of claims by the European Advertising Tripartite that the ban
would violate Article 10 of the Convention,92 the question arises whether
such claims have merit in light of the preceding case law. Similarly, the
possible invalidation of a complete ban on tobacco advertising raises the
question of whether the current ban on broadcast tobacco advertising com-
ports with the free speech jurisprudence of the ECJ. Finally, this analysis
presents an opportunity to reconsider whether the current broadcast ban on
cigarette advertising in the United States is constitutional.
A. The Proposed and Current European Bans
Application of the analysis from Part III, above, demonstrates the
strength of the advertisers' argument that the ban of all cigarette advertis-
ing would violate Article 10 of the Convention. First, the action would be
carried out by public authorities, so the provisions of Article 10 apply.
Second, the ban would be based in law. Finally, even conceding that the
goal of protecting health is clearly a legitimate one,93 such an absolute ban
does not appear to satisfy the fourth element of the Barthold test. This test
requires that the measure be "necessary in a democratic society." 94 To be
considered necessary, any interference with the freedom of speech "must
be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued and must be justified on
grounds that are not merely reasonable but relevant and sufficient."95
An EU-wide prohibition of all tobacco advertising appears not only
to be disproportionate, but also to have insufficient grounds for justifica-
tion. The analysis above shows that any outright ban on speech by a par-
ticular group is likely to be considered disproportionate. Even in Coca,
89. Valentine, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
90. Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 827.
91. See supra Part I.
92. See supra note 4.
93. This seems especially clear given the ECJ's reluctance to question lawmakers' mo-
tives. See Barthold v. Germany, 7 Eur. CL H.R. (ser. A) at 383 (1985).
94. Id. at401.
95. Coca v. Spain, 18 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 14-15 (1994).
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where the Court upheld broad restrictions on lawyer advertising, the Court
96
noted that the lawyer had some opportunities for publicity. Furthermore,
the justification for the ban also appears to be insufficient. If the goal of
the ban is truly to protect the health of EU citizens, the proper route would
be simply to outlaw tobacco. So long as tobacco remains legal, if the ECJ
applies its standard analysis, it is unlikely to uphold the proposed ban.
The current EU ban on broadcast tobacco advertising poses a more
difficult question, especially since it has existed for nearly a decade with-
out any legal challenges. However, applying the above analysis, it appears
that even this less restrictive ban might be found in violation of the Con-
vention. As with the proposed outright ban, the current broadcast ban eas-
ily satisfies the first three prongs of the test set forth in Barthold. It is car-
ried out by public authorities, based in law, and carried out in the pursuit
of a legitimate goal. The analysis differs, however, concerning the neces-
sity of the ban. The broadcast ban is certainly more proportionate to the
aim pursued than an outright ban. In the commercial speech cases analyzed
above, such as Coca, the ECJ was much less hostile to partial bans than
outright bans. However, even the broadcast ban faces difficulty in meeting
the requirement that a measure restricting speech be "justified on grounds
that are not merely reasonable but relevant and sufficient."'9 Based on the
reasoning of the ECHR in Open Door Counselling and Dublin Well
Woman, several factors support the idea that the broadcast ban violates the
Convention: smoking is a legal activity, the ban is perpetual, and the po-
tential penalties for violation are substantial. However, smoking is also an
activity that poses serious health risks, so the courts would likely employ a
more deferential level of scrutiny toward this ban than in other contexts.
Weighing the above factors, the current ban on broadcast tobacco adver-
tising appears to be inconsistent with the case law of the ECJ, but whether
the Court would in fact strike it down is far from clear.
B. The Existing U.S. Ban
If the preceding analysis is correct, that the proposed EU ban of to-
bacco advertising would violate Article 10 of the Convention and the cur-
rent broadcast ban may do so, could the current U.S. ban on broadcast
cigarette advertising9 8 survive a constitutional challenge? Based solely on
Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell,99 the only case that has squarely ad-
96. Id.
97. Id. at 15.
98. See 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (1998).
99. Capital Broadcasting Co., 333 F. Supp. 582 (D.D.C. 1971), aff'd without opinion
sub nom. Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Kleindienst, 405 U.S. 1000 (1972).
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dressed the question whether the ban on broadcast cigarette advertising
violates the First Amendment, the answer appears to be yes. In that case,
the district court held that the statute had "no substantial effect on the ex-
ercise of petitioners' First Amendment rights[,]'"' and the Supreme Court
agreed.''
While the ban on cigarette advertising has not been overturned, three
separate reasons would suggest that Capital Broadcasting Co. is no longer
good law. First, the decision itself left some room for doubt whether the
case would have reached the same result had it been brought by the adver-
tisers themselves rather than the broadcasters. The court asserted that the
broadcasters had "lost no right to speak-they have only lost an ability to
collect revenue from others for broadcasting their commercial mes-
sages.""'° Without explicitly addressing the issue, the court implied that the
broadcasters lacked standing to challenge the law.
The second reason that suggests Capital Broadcasting Co. should no
longer be followed is its inconsistency with the Supreme Court's later de-
cision in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy."' Justice Rehnquist noted in
his Virginia dissent that the Court's decision must be logically read as
protecting the advertisement of cigarettes and liquor "so long as it is not
misleading or does not promote an illegal product or enterprise."' ' Moreo-
ver, at least one respected commentator has suggested that perhaps Justice
Rehnquist was right.'05
Finally, Capital Broadcasting Co. is inconsistent with Central Hud-
son. Applying the Central Hudson four-part test, the first two parts are
relatively straightforward. First, cigarette advertising concerns an activity
that is lawful, and cigarette advertising is not inherently misleading. There-
fore, the speech is protected. Second, the government has an admittedly
substantial interest in protecting the health of the public by discouraging
smoking.
The third and fourth parts of the Central Hudson test are perhaps
somewhat more subjective than the first two, but they are sufficiently de-
manding that the ban on cigarette advertising cannot meet them. The ban
does not directly advance the government's interest in protecting public
health for three reasons. First, it leaves open exposure to many other forms
100. Capital Broadcasting Co., 333 F. Supp. at 584.
101. Capital Broadcasting Co., 405 U.S. 1000.
102. Capital Broadcasting Co., 333 F. Supp. at 584 (emphasis added).
103. Virginia State Board. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748 (1976).
104. Id. at 781 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
105. RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOVAK, TREATISE ON CONsTrrIUIoNAL LAW:
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 20.31, at 170 (2d ed. 1992).
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of advertising. Second, it does nothing to alleviate the real threat to public
health-the cigarettes themselves, not the advertisements for them.'
Third, given the decline of cigarette smoking among American adults and
the widespread knowledge that cigarettes are harmful, the goal of cigarette
companies that target adult"° audiences with cigarette advertising must
logically be to increase the companies' shares of a shrinking market and
not to attract new adult smokers. While the government clearly has an in-
terest in protecting public health, a law that serves primarily to protect ex-
isting market shares has no relation to this interest. Furthermore, the ban is
more extensive than necessary. Time, place, and manner restrictions could
constitutionally be placed on broadcast advertisements to limit their impact
on young audiences, analogous to restrictions on the broadcasting of offen-
sive material.
Based simply on Central Hudson, the ban on cigarette advertising
appears to be unconstitutional. However, the Supreme Court has consid-
erably restricted the reach of Central Hudson over the past decade, and
there are several reasons that the ban on cigarette advertising may today
survive a constitutional challenge. First, "of all forms of communication, it
is broadcasting that has received the most limited First Amendment pro-
tection."' ° Second, the Supreme Court has cited with apparent approval its
summary affirmation of Capital Broadcasting v. Mitchell.'°9 Third, the
Court has also approved a "greater-includes-the-lesser" philosophy, which
reasons that it is anomalous for the government to be allowed to prohibit
an activity or product if it may not prohibit advertising of the same sub-
ject.10 Finally, the Court in Board of Trustees v. Fox"' modified the "no
more extensive than necessary" language of the Central Hudson test in fa-
106. Of course, the ban follows from a legislative determination that advertising in-
creases the demand for cigarettes. Given the Court's unquestioning acceptance in Posadas
of a legislative assumption that advertising increases the demand for gambling, see Posadas
de Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 344 (1986), it is unlikely that the
Court would require greater evidence of causation in this context.
107. This Note does not consider the issue of advertising directed at minors, which could
presumably be prohibited lawfully under even the most favorable reading of Central Hud-
son.
108. F.C.C. v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978). Note that none of the above
cases involved broadcasting.
109. See Posadas, 478 U.S. at 347 n.10.
110. See id. at 346. This doctrine thoroughly undercuts the significance of Virginia
State Board of Pharmacy. If the FDA may ban a particular drug, it stands to reason under
this analysis that the federal government may now ban even truthful advertising of pre-
scription drugs.
111. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989).
[Vol. 51
COMMERCIAL SPEECH
vor of the more deferential requirement that the restriction of speech have
a "reasonable fit" with the asserted governmental goal."
2
V. CONCLUSION
This Note has shown the existence of relatively similar standards by
which the European and American courts now examine infringements of
commercial speech. In both legal systems, the courts protect advertising as
speech, but allow legislatures considerably more freedom to regulate it
than other forms of speech. This Note has demonstrated that the proposed
EU ban of tobacco advertising violates the European Convention on Hu-
man Rights, and that the current EU broadcast ban may also do so. While
the latter appears to be safe from judicial scrutiny after a long history of
acquiescence, the former clearly goes far beyond measures that can be
considered "necessary in a democratic society."
Additionally, this Note has shown that the current U.S. ban on broad-
cast cigarette advertising is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's deci-
sions in Central Hudson and Virginia State Board of Pharmacy. This sug-
gests that the ban should therefore be narrowed to allow cigarette
advertising in such a time and manner that children would be unlikely to
see it unless the Court explicitly overturns those decisions. While the U.S.
broadcast ban may satisfy the deferential standards that the Supreme Court
has recently set for restrictions on commercial speech, the U.S. judiciary
should nonetheless follow the lead of the ECJ and ECHR in promoting free
speech rather than hindering it. It would be ironic if the United States, long
considered a leader in the protection of civil liberties, continued to move
toward less protection of free speech while the European Union, with
democratic governments in Member States such as Germany and France
that have existed in their current forms for barely half a century, led the
way forward through greater judicial protection of free speech. Unless and
until tobacco is outlawed, courts must recognize the rights of cigarette
manufacturers in both the United States and the European Union to adver-
tise their products to adults in their respective jurisdictions.
112. Id. at480.
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